Internet-Draft | BGP Maximum Prefix Limits Inbound | January 2022 |
Aelmans, et al. | Expires 23 July 2022 | [Page] |
This document describes mechanisms to limit the negative impact of route leaks [RFC7908] and/or resource exhaustion in BGP [RFC4271] implementations.¶
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This document updates [RFC4271] by revising control mechanism which limit the negative impact of route leaks [RFC7908] and/or resource exhaustion in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementations. While [RFC4271] described methods to tear down BGP sessions or discard UPDATES after certain thresholds are exceeded, some nuances in this specification were missing resulting in inconsistencies between BGP implementations.¶
This section updates [RFC4271] to specify what events can result in AutomaticStop (Event 8) in the BGP FSM.¶
The following paragraph replaces the second paragraph of Section 6.7 (Cease), which starts with "A BGP speaker MAY support" and ends with "The speaker MAY also log this locally.":¶
A BGP speaker MAY support the ability to impose a locally-configured, upper bound on the number of address prefixes the speaker is willing to accept from a neighbor (inbound maximum prefix limit). The limit on the prefixes accepted from a neighbor can be applied before policy processing (Pre-Policy) or after policy processing (Post-Policy). When the upper bound is reached, the speaker, under control of local configuration, either:¶
Subcode | Symbolic Name |
---|---|
1 | Threshold exceeded: Maximum Number of Prefixes Received |
This section updates Section 8 [RFC4271], the paragraph that starts with "One reason for an AutomaticStop event is" and ends with "The local system automatically disconnects the peer." is replaced with:¶
This section updates [RFC4271] by adding a subsection after Section 9.4 (Originating BGP routes) to specify various events that can lead up to AutomaticStop (Event 8) in the BGP FSM.¶
Maximum Prefix Limits are an essential tool for routing operations and SHOULD be used to increase stability for the global routing ecosystem.¶
This memo requests that IANA updates the name of subcode "Maximum Number of Prefixes Reached" to "Threshold exceeded: Maximum Number of Prefixes Received" in the "Cease NOTIFICATION message subcodes" registry under the "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters" group.¶
The authors would like to thank Saku Ytti and John Heasley (NTT Ltd.), Jeff Haas, Colby Barth and John Scudder (Juniper Networks), Martijn Schmidt (i3D.net), Teun Vink (BIT), Sabri Berisha (eBay), Martin Pels (Quanza), Steven Bakker (AMS-IX), Aftab Siddiqui (ISOC), Yu Tianpeng, Ruediger Volk (Deutsche Telekom), Robert Raszuk (NTT), Jakob Heitz (Cisco), Warren Kumari (Google), Ben Maddison (Workonline), Randy Bush, Brian Dickson, Gyan Mishra (Verizon) and John John Heasley (NTTA) for their support, insightful reviews, and comments.¶
This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC7942. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.¶
The below table provides an overview (as of the moment of writing) of which vendors have produced implementation of inbound prefix limits. Each table cell shows the applicable configuration keywords if the vendor implemented the feature.¶
Vendor | Type A Pre-Policy | Type B Post-Policy |
---|---|---|
Cisco IOS XR | maximum-prefix | |
Cisco IOS XE | maximum-prefix | |
Juniper Junos OS | prefix-limit | accepted-prefix-limit, or prefix-limit combined with 'keep none' |
Nokia SR OS | prefix-limit | |
NIC.CZ BIRD | 'import keep filtered' combined with 'receive limit' | 'import limit' or 'receive limit' |
OpenBSD OpenBGPD | max-prefix | |
Arista EOS | maximum-routes | maximum-accepted-routes |
Huawei VRPv5 | peer route-limit | |
Huawei VRPv8 | peer route-limit | peer route-limit accept-prefix |
TBD¶