IEN 32 Section 2.3.3.12 Title: Catenet Monitoring and Control: A Model for the Gateway Component Author: John Davidson [Davidson@BBNE] Note: This document contains figures which are not included in this on line version, the figures may be obtained in hardcopy from the author.
CATENET MONITORING AND CONTROL:
A MODEL FOR THE GATEWAY COMPONENT
John Davidson
Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc.
IEN #32
Internet Notebook Section 2.3.3.12
April 28, 1978
Catenet Monitoring and Control:
A Model for the Gateway Component
1. INTRODUCTION
At the last Internet meeting, some concern was expressed
that we don't have a real "model" for what a gateway is, what it
does, and how it does it, and that without such a model it is
somewhat dificult to describe the kinds of activities which
should be monitored or controlled by a Gateway Monitoring and
Control Center (GMCC). To respond to that concern, we have
written this note to express our recent thoughts about a gateway
model. Although the note centers primarily around the topic of a
gateway model, we have also included a few thoughts about
possible models for the other components of a general
internetwork structure.
The note proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we try to
establish a reason for wanting a model of a given internetwork
component, and present a brief overview of the potential benefits
of Monitoring and Control. This presentation is largely
pedagogical since it is assumed that this document will, for a
while at least, be the only introduction to the topic available.
In Section 3 we discuss the fundamental kinds of activities
which must be performed by any internet component if it is to
participate in Monitoring and Control. This section establishes
motivation for some of the mechanisms discussed in the rest of
the paper.
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In Section 4 we discuss the roles which the hosts, local
Packet Switching Networks (PSNs), and the Gateway Monitoring and
Control Centers (GMCCs) may have to play in Monitoring and
Control for the internet.
Then, in Section 5, we finally begin to discuss the
principle characteristics of a possible gateway model. We
examine first a list of practical constraints which influence the
way in which the model is being designed, and then, suitably
constrained, we begin the task of developing the model itself. A
complete modelling has not yet been performed, and is likely to
take quite a while to complete. Section 5, however, gives a
suitable indication of the way in which the model will be
developed, and of the alternative interpretations available to
gateway designers who pattern their implementations after the
model.
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2. CONTEXT F OR MODELING
It is assumed that gateways exist to make communication
possible between hosts on different packet switching networks. In
this regard, they actually serve to make a single network out of
several diverse, disjoint networks. Thus gateways can be said to
form the nodes of a super-network, called a Catenet, whose
"links" are the individual packet switching networks, and whose
"hosts" are simply the individual hosts of the constituent PSNs.
As the nodes of this super-net, the gateways will be responsible
in part or in whole for tasks like routing, fragmentation, flow
control, reassembly, retransmission, and perhaps data
transformation (e.g. encryption/decryption), access control, and
even authentication.
We can assume that there are benefits to be derived from
having the Catenet operate in a coordinated fashion. However,
coordination is not achieved by default, because the Catenet is
being constructed in pieces, with each piece potentially under
the control of a distinct administrator, each gateway implemented
in a unique processor, and each program conforming to a different
programmer's view of the workings of a gateway.
The Internetworking group brought together by ARPA is
serving as the coordinating authority for the development of many
of the components of the Catenet. To make the important
administrative and technical decisions associated with Catenet
construction, however, this group must be provided with technical
inputs. Many of these inputs can come from theoretical studies,
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protocol investigations, and pre-construction experiments,
modeling, and simulation during Catenet development. But the
most important source of technical inputs will ultimately be the
Catenet itself. If the true operational characteristics of the
net can be readily (and continually) determined, then the
administrative issues associated with Catenet performance
(questions like "why is the throughput not as predicted", "what
components are proving unreliable", "should the net be expanded
or reconfigured", etc) can be adequately resolved by appeal to
the recorded statistics; collection and recording of these
operational statistics form a part of what we refer to as Catenet
"Monitoring". Also, since the Catenet will sometimes be the
"target" of the Internet group or ARPA administrative policy,
then, insofar as policy affects the operation of the net (e.g.
such "policy" decisions as "failed components should be dumped,
reloaded, and restarted ASAP"), technical tools must be provided
which help implement the policy; these kinds of tools form a
part of what we refer to as Catenet "Control". (Some readers may
prefer to think of this as "Coordination" rather than "Control"
which unfortunately may carry other undesirable connotations.)
In order to be able to Monitor and Control the operation of
the Catenet in accordance with administrative policy, in the
presence of the diverse component implementations, some model for
the network as a whole should be developed. Futher, models for
each of the component types (gateways, packet switching nets,
hosts) should be developed. These model implementations should
then be instrumented in a way that makes it possible to
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accumulate the technical inputs and to effect the operational
policy desired by Catenet administrators. If the model
implementations are appropriately general, then it is reasonable
to dictate that individual implementations adhere to these basic
models.
BBN is currently pursuing the development of a model for the
gateway component of the Catenet. In particular, we are trying
to define how the model should be instrumented to provide the
appropriate kinds of Monitoring and Control capabilities. Most
of the capabilities we think are needed are similar in function
to the capabilities already developed for the ARPANET and its
Network Control Center, NCC. We are proposing, and in fact have
actually begun, the construction of a Gateway Monitoring and
Control Center (GMCC) patterned after the NCC (and currently
sharing resources with it, since the NCC is already accessible to
internetwork traffic and since the scope of the current GMCC is
at this time quite modest).
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3. FUNDAMENTALS OF MONITORING AND CONTROL
We assert that all of the Catenet components should be
properly instrumented in software (and if necessary, in hardware)
to measure the service which the Catenet as a whole provides, and
to enhance the maintainability of the net as a whole. The
instrumentation should provide us with all the mechanisms
required to perform
Performance Monitoring
Event Recording
Functional Testing
Component Maintenance
Here, by Performance Monitoring, we intend that the status of _______________________
Catenet components (both the binary "working/not-working"
indication and the status of internal operational components) be
made available to the GMCC. This will require that the Catenet
components have a mechanism for communicating periodic status
reports and instantaneous error reports "back" to the GMCC. This
mechanism may or may not require that the reports from the
various net components be synchronized in order to enable the
GMCC to obtain a "snapshot" of the network as a whole; if
synchronization is required, a synchronizing mechanism will be
required as well. It is also undetermined whether a protected
path (e.g. one using encryption to prevent spoofing) is required
for communicating this information through the Catenet.
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There should also be a mechanism by which the GMCC can
request performance data from a Catenet component in the case of
non-recurring measurements. The set of monitoring mechanisms
installed in any particular component may differ from the set
installed in any other component, depending on the granularity of
measurement which is desired in each case.
By Event Recording, we intend that the raw statistical data _______________
on, say, the number of messages or packets passing through a
given component be made available to the GMCC in a standard way.
Not only must there be a standard way of collecting the event
statistics, but there must also be a way for a designated
authority like the GMCC to reset the event counters, say, or turn
on or off the event recording mechanisms. We shall have more to
say on what events are significant in a subsequent section.
By Functional Testing we intend that the GMCC be able to ___________________
direct the activities of the Catenet components either directly
(by commanding performance of some task like message generation)
or indirectly (by sending, or directing other components to send,
messages through a given component) in order to exercise
component mechanisms for error analysis or load testing. A
useful mechanism in the ARPANET is the ability to isolate failed
hardware components by forcing a loopback under software control
at each of the component boundaries. The analogue of this scheme
in the Catenet is probably simpler, since the boundaries are
logically in software (e.g. in the gateway software in cases
where a local PSN or another nearby gateway is being tested) or
associated with the local PSN which may have reasonably flexible
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control of the interface which connects it to a network host or
to a gateway. Looping performed within a component should also
be possible.
To make use of these testing facilities, we need the ability
to generate artificial traffic (and to discard it) and to reflect
it (or turn it around) as required. Reflecting messages at
gateways can, for example, give a measure of the throughput of
Catenet links.
By Component Maintenance, we intend that the GMCC have the _____________________
ability to coordinate, and in some cases perform, the analysis of
failure for failed components, the restoration of failed
components, the institution of program fixes, and the
distribution of new releases. It is not clear that Component
Maintenance can be the responsibility of just a single GMCC, of
course, but if it is to be the responsibility of any GMCC-like
component, then the mechanisms by which the failed component is
to be handled, and how it is to be of use in the maintenance
activity, should be adequately modelled for each component in
question. In this regard, we see a potential need for
incorporating mechanisms for self diagnosis in the component
models, for enabling the GMCC (or some other network host in
conjunction with or in place of the GMCC) to read and write
arbitrary locations in a component's memory, etc.
Note too that the gateway programs will be provided by
various implementers. These implementers may in some cases be
willing to allow a given GMCC to handle reloads and restarts of
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their component when it fails. Both the implementer and the GMCC
staff may have to be involved in debugging the component if the
gateway's model debugging facility (which presumes the use of a
GMCC) is all the original implementers have for accessing their
component remotely. It might prove useful for the GMCC to be
able to copy the contents of a failed component into a file for
later inspection by the original implementers in case they are
unavailable to copy the contents themselves at the time of
malfunction.
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4. MODELS FOR THE PRINCIPLE CATENET COMPONENTS This note is principally about gateway modelling. However, we have asserted throughout, the need to model the other components of the general Catenet as well, so that we can use them in Monitoring and Control applications where they are needed and where they can be useful. Here we describe briefly the goals we have for modelling the other components. 4.1 The GMCC The functions of a GMCC should be able to be performed by any host in the composite net. In view of this, a high level description, or model, of the way a GMCC operates should be created. Both the GMCC program(s) and its data base(s) should be described in a way which allows Catenet users to reproduce the GMCC functions (this basically requires coding of the GMCC programs in a high order language) and to interrogate or duplicate the accumulated data base(s) as required for their own special purposes. Because each gateway, host, or local PSN component of the composite Catenet is potentially the property of a distinct administrative authority, it is conceivable that each might actually be monitored or controlled by a distinct GMCC. This would not necessarily be the best arrangement for purposes of overall net maintainability, but nonetheless must be allowed for. What is more likely, however, is that a given administrator will give permission to some approved Catenet GMCC to perform the Monitoring and Control activities associated with Performance - 10 -
Monitoring, say, or with Event Recording, but reserve for itself
the ability to perform the activities associated with Functional
Testing and Component Maintenance. In this case, the
Administrator's host will have to understand and be able to
duplicate the model GMCC functions, and the Catenet component
will have to know to respond to one or the other GMCC depending
on the function being requested. Since different authorities
might exist for each different function, this capability should
be modelled. Further, the mechanism for changing the name or
address of the various designated authorities should also be
modelled. Then the fact that each Catenet component knows the
name of the authority designated to perform a given function
makes it possible to restrict arbitrary hosts from abusing their
ability to emulate a GMCC.
4.2 The Hosts
Members of the ARPANET NCC staff have asserted that "a key
factor in network maintainability is the centralization of the
responsibility for providing adequate user service. Since
service is best defined at the man/machine interface, a
significant gain in maintainability would come about if the user
interface were completely at the man/machine boundary. By
including a host within the sphere of responsibility of network
maintenance, there could be more uniform and speedier resolution
of problems within that host. Since the network design allows
for dissimilar node programs, not much additional complexity is
required to maintain a set of dissimilar service hosts. (Thus)
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the scope of the network should be expanded to providing user
services with corresponding benefits for both unified design and
maintainability."
This may be an extreme position, and may not actually be as
easy as anticipated by the NCC staff, but nevertheless it is a
position which has at least some validity, especially in view of
the fact that gateways are themselves just hosts, and much of the
modelling performed for gateways can thus be applied to other
general purpose hosts.
Consider what Monitoring and Control might be possible if
some small component of the host's network software, such as the
TCP program, were instrumented to allow Performance Monitoring,
Event Recording, etc. under control of a GMCC. The
instrumentation would simply provide that the TCP keep track of
its events of interest and arrange for them to be made available
in a convenient way to some other protocol module (perhaps) for
transmission to the GMCC. In addition, if there is to be Control
of a TCP, some internal means should be provided for a process to
direct certain actions of the TCP (for example the resetting of
accounting statistics).
Certain other capabilities might also prove useful. The TCP
should be able to report to the GMCC any errors it observes in
packet formats, packet delivery, etc. so that host personnel with
a reliable TCP implementation need not be concerned about error
analysis for newly added, undebugged hosts, say. The GMCC is
certainly in the appropriate position to be able to correlate
abnormal TCP interactions with Catenet component outages and be
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able to explain the abnormal behavior to the host via messages to
the TCP. The TCP should be able to be instructed to discard
certain messages or to echo them back to their source. It should
perhaps be able to timestamp and trace various messages. These
kinds of activities would all be possible given an appropriate
and uniform instrumentation of the various TCP implementations.
4.3 The PSNs
The links of the Catenet are the local PSNs. Unlike usual
network links, these links are equipped with a processing
capability in the form of their own node computers or their own
NCC hosts, etc. Whatever form this processing capability takes,
it can presumably be made to communicate with other Catenet
components using the protocols for GMCC-to-component and
component-to-GMCC communication. The local PSNs should be able
to report errors in interfacing which occur at the PSN/gateway
interface; they can also report gateway ups and downs as they
observe them; they might be instrumented to assist in tracing and
looping of messages sent to or through them; they could keep
track of the length of gateway outages; and since the PSN is the
only component with hardware (in most cases) connections to the
gateway and host components, it can perhaps help in the restart
or reload of these components. The techniques for performing any
of these activities should be carefully and completely modelled.
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5. A MODEL FOR THE GATEWAY COMPONENT The principle thing we expect a gateway to do is to perform message routing; a suggested routing mechanism is presented in IEN No. 30, "Gateway Routing: An Implementation Specification", by Strazisar and Perlman. Beyond this, there are several secondary activities in which the gateway must play a role, and the large majority of these can be clustered under the general heading of Monitoring and Control. These are the activities we are most concerned with here. As discussed earlier, the gateway component, like any other component, should be instrumented to include mechanisms which allow it to cooperate with a GMCC in providing Performance Monitoring, Event Recording, Functional Testing, and Component (i.e. gateway) Maintenance. It is the role of the model to identify the mechanisms which should be used within the gateway to provide these various functions. 5.1 Considerations Affecting the Design The intent of this section is to give some insight into the process by which the model for the gateway component will be developed. There are a number of fundamental considerations which should be stated beforehand because of their impact on the way we want to think of gateways as an entity and thus on the way we think of the necessarily composed. The first of these is that a gateway should be considered to have a net-independent part and one or more net-dependent parts. The net-independent part should be considered the heart of the gateway -- the place where the - 14 -
common functions of routing, flow control, etc. are actually
performed; this part is hopefully divorced from considerations of
the networks to which the gateway is attached. The net-dependent
parts on the other hand may all be different, since the networks
in most cases will be different, but each should have the same
eessential structure: there will be modules which gate messages
to and from the attached net, and modules which append or remove
local headers to or from internet (and other) messages, etc. One
of the challenges for the model designer and gateway implementer
is to carefully design the boundary between the net-dependent and
net-independent functions.
The gateway model should be able to accommodate more than
one type of gateway implementation. That is, it should
accurately describe or apply to implementations such as:
- the conventional gateway. This is a single processor
performing gateway functions only and connected to only two
nets.
- a two- or multi-processor gateway. This is a distributed
implementation of the gateway, such as the "half-gateway"
model once considered; the mechanisms used by the separate
processors to communicate with each other should not affect
the model design.
- gateways within general purpose host processors where the
gateway program is just one of several that may want access
to the network.
- gateways connected to three or more networks.
- gateways using only a single net interface. Such an
arrangement might result if, for example, a single medium
were used by two different nets. readdressing, say, ....
- both big and small (in terms of power, size, cost,
capability) gateways (including very simple - perhaps purely
hardware - implementations).
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- existing ARPANET gateways.
- existing othernet (sic) gateways.
- the gateway module which sits between a host TCP, say, and
the network, and whose job it is to select a destination
gateway consistent with the destination host.
- a gateway with two or more interfaces to a single network.
- a gateway which is (either always or sometimes) unwilling or
unable to participate in Monitoring and Control exercises.
- gateways which are responsible for access control or
authentication. The need for these special functions may
impact the form of certain mechanisms proposed for use in
the model implementation.
- gateways which need to perform fragmentation or reassembly
of encrypted data messages, or which need to be able to
understand special packet formats associated with secure
data transmissions.
- gateways which may without warning turn into "one-way" paths
only for such applications as military EMCON.
5.2 The Beginnings of a Model
There are several kinds of information which the gateway
should be able to exchange with the GMCC in support of its
Monitoring and Control activities. Among them are:
Administrative Information
This is information that identifies the gateway uniquely
among all the components of the composite Catenet. To get a
proper picture of the net at any given time, a GMCC would
like to be able to discern, among other things,
the computer type
the memory size
the gateway characterization (conventional, ARPANET, ...)
the Administrator's name, address, phone number
the program size, release number, release date and time
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the addresses of hosts serving as GMCCs
the names of connected nets, etc.
Information such as this may best be sent unsolicited to a
special service host when a gateway first comes up on the
net after some outage; interested experimenters could then
retrieve the information from the host much as is currently
done in the ARPANET for retrieving Host status information.
Measurement Information
This information is simply the collective set of statistics
accumulated by the gateway during its operation. They
reflect the processing performed by the gateway in servicing
internet traffic.
Monitoring Information
This is primarily the "up/down", "up for how long", "planned
outages", "recent crash explanation", "net interface reset",
etc. kinds of information which dictates to the GMCC the
status and health of the gateway component.
Control Information
This is either the information sent by the GMCC to cause the
gateway to enter a test, reload, or, restart mode, or the
information sent by the gateway to the GMCC to report the
results of component testing, to dump some of its memory,
etc.
Debugging Information
Patterned after a general purpose time sharing host's DDT
program which has complete control over the execution of
subservient programs, the information associated with
debugging includes commands to read or write a cell, to set
or reset (pseudo) breakpoints, to search memory, etc. and
the responses to these commands. Two kinds of DDTs may have
to be accommodated in any given gateway implementation, one
to be used by experimenters, say, and one, like XNET, to be
used during initial debugging.
Descriptive Information
This is the information which conveys to the GMCC the list
of capabilities possessed by the gateway; it includes a
listing of the kinds of information collected and reported
by the gateway, a characterization of queue capacities, a
list of settable operational parameters, a description of
the histograms maintained by the gateway, a list of the
protocols supported, etc. It responds to the GMCC's
questions about "what can you do", "how much can you do",
etc.
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Experimental Information
This is the information associated with the manipulation of
the component by experimenters. It is in part descriptive
(experimenters can ask what experiments are supported, what
parameters are allowed, what range on parameters is
accepted, etc.), in part control (they can request
initiation of an experiment), and in part measurement (they
can request operational statistics associated with the
experiment), but it seems reasonable to distinguish it as
distinct from these other operational aspects insofar as
possible; not all gateways which provide descriptive,
control, and measurement information will also support
experimental use.
Accounting Information
This information is basically the set of raw statistics
which should be used by an administrator for charging for
gateway utilization. It is reasonable to distinguish this
information from pure measurement information since it is
not necessarily of interest to a GMCC worrying about
functional capabilities, and will likely have to be reported
to some special host rather than a general purpose community
GMCC.
Operational Information
This is included here just as a reminder that in addition to
manipulating all the information associated with Monitoring
and Control activities, the gateway will also want to
occassionally handle internet messages, routing messages,
and the rest of the information that is its "reason for
being" in the first place!
Note that it is possible to consider that each individual
kind of information is associated with a particular kind of
"event" which occurs within a gateway. Thus we may have
Measurement events, Monitoring events, and even Administrative
events within a functioning gateway. It is also the role of the
gateway model to specify how these events are to be recognized,
recorded, reported, caused, prevented, suspended, continued, etc.
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At least three notions are central to our discusionss at
this point. First, we have the four basic functions that we
have discussed in detail before: Performance Monitoring, Event
Recording, Functional Testing, and Component Maintenance. From a
suitable, high level external viewpoint, these are the functions
that the gateway is involved in. Second, we have the different
kinds of information which must be recorded by the gateway and
transported between the gateway and the GMCC. Each different
kind of information implies possibly a distinct formatting
requirement, distinct collection mechanism, etc. Finally, there
are the several different mechanisms which must exist inside the
gateway that can be used to collect, record, and report the
different kinds of information. The most apparent mechanisms
which exist in the gateway implementations are processes.
Processes are the addressable resources which carry on dialogues
with the GMCC and with each other in some cases. In addition to
the distinct processes, there are other mechanisms which we will
just label as "routines". Routines are best thought of as
utility functions which may be invoked by any of the gateway
processes to help each get its collecting, recording, and
reporting done. An example of a utility routine might be one
which formats a message according to gateway-to-GMCC protocol
specifications and adds it to a queue of messages to be sent.
Examples of processes are
- the monitoring process which generates the periodic and
spontaneous reports to the GMCC describing the
operational status of the gateway.
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- the measurement process which delivers cumulative
statistics to the GMCC.
- the echoing process which returns all received messages
to the source from which they originated.
- the memory transport process which moves portions of
the gateway memory (programs or data) to or from the
GMCC.
- the terminal handling process which excanges ASCII
character streams between the gateway's terminal (if
one is present) and a specified internetwork source or
destination.
- the debugging process.
- the message generator process.
- etc.
It should be obvious that processes do not deal one-to-one
with the kinds of information we discussed above. A given
process, such as the measurement process, may be used to report
the cumulative statistics of each of several kinds of
information. Alternatively, it may take more than one process to
deal with all the information of any particular kind; for example
experimental information as discussed above. And it is certainly
likely that multiple distinct processes will have a need to share
a single common routine whenever their processing requirements
are identical; for example, tracing of messages sent from the
GMCC to the debugger, to the echoer, or to the terminal handler
should be done by having each process (conceptually) invoke the
single trace mechanism. It may also be the case that two
processes can be cascaded for the purpose of combining different
kinds of information into a single net message.
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5.3 A Sample Modeling
We will develop the gateway model in terms of a general
purpose host's implementation, since this allows inclusion of as
much mechanism as may be useful for the more general
implementation. The figure below shows the principle components
of the input handler for a net-dependent part of a general
purpose gateway.
First there is a hardware component which represents the physical
interface between the network and the gateway processor.
Obviously this interface will be different for different nets and
for different processors, but as a model component should always
correspond to some real chunk of hardware in any implementation.
Second, there is a piece of code which serves to control the
input portion of the net interface hardware. Its basic function
is to effect the reading of messages from the network into
gateway memory. In the process, it may perform intermediate
parsing, do checksum and consistency processing, etc.
Third, there is a message queue where unparsed messages reside
after they have been received by the net interface routine but
before they have been processed by any other gateway routine.
This queue may be implemented in any of several ways, and may
only have room for a single message in some implementations. (A
"higher" level routine may perform queue management in this case,
using a different data structure.)
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Fourth, there is a second routine depicted whose job it is to
parse the received messages one-by-one and distribute them
individually to new message queues based on the contents of their
local network header.
Finally, there are several model components (including both data
structures and routines) which are not pictured, but still must
be modelled; a subsequent and more complete modelling effort will
certainly include them. These are data structures like buffer
pools and routines like buffer managers, etc.
Associated with these model components are a large number of
parameters, both static and operational. These are the things
we've been calling "events". In the following we give a sampling
of the events of interest for each of the event types we
identified before. The sampling is not complete, but it is
representative of the kinds of information we might be interested
in for purposes of Monitoring and Control in the gateway
modelling. Of course, not all of the events are of equal
interest or value; as modelers, we should attempt to identify as
many as we can, and leave to the individual implementers the
selection of which events they really want to record, report,
etc.
Events of Interest:
Administrative -
the name and manufacturer of the hardware interface
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Measurement -
a histogram of log[base 2] message sizes
message counts for each distinct local header type
Monitoring -
cumulative uptime
number of interface errors
Control -
reset counters
place a message on the input queue
Debugging -
read the hardware status register
Descriptive -
Fan out for local headers
queue size
maximum message size
Experimental -
discard every second message at the interface
Accounting -
total bits received at the interface
5.4 Continuing the Sample Modeling
In this section we continue the sample model introduced
above by showing how certain of the data paths might be extended
to account for subsequent message processing. It should be easy
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to identify the events of interest in this extension given a
little thought. Subsequent attempts at modelling will enumerate
these in detail. Note that there are probably several
alternative ways of depicting these later stages of message
processing; this fact is compounded by the fact that this is the
point in message processing where the
net-dependent/net-independent boundary may be crossed. Further
discussion of alternatives to this part of the model is postponed
to the section entitled "Issues".
Figure 2 shows the extension to the model. It begins where
the previous figure left off. First, note that at this point we
have separated the various types of messages arriving at the net
interface into unique queues according to indicators in the local
header. For this figure we will follow only a single path -- the
one followed by internet messages which carry the normal internet
traffic. These internet packets are removed from their queue by
a routine which separates them again, this time according to the
version bit, into a queue of messages which employ the previous
internet formatting conventions and a queue of messages which
employ the current conventions.
From this latter queue, the messages are sent to another routine
whose job is to initiate the option processing. In Figure 2, we
have represented the options as subroutines without further
elaboration; subsequent versions of the model should provide the
elaboration.
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Finally, after option processing, the messsages are separated
again into individual queues according to the values in the
protocol field. Here, separate queues may be formed for
unrecognized protocols, previous and current versions of TCP,
gateway routing messages, and eventually the Monitoring and
Control messages, the Datagram Protocol, the Real-Time Protocol,
etc.
As stated, we will not elaborate here on the events of
interest for this part of the model; some should be obvious.
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5.5 Unresolved Issues In this section we want to address a number of issues which are not yet resolved in the modelling of the gateway component. Their resolution will probably depend on prolonged discussions in certain cases, on snap decisions in others; possibly in some cases a satisfactory resolution will not be possible, and whatever alternative solutions are proposed will all have to be included in a generalized modelling to make sure the modelling is comprehensive enough. At any rate, the topics which need further investigation are presented below. 5.5.1 Are the Event Types Correct First there needs to be some general agreement that the event types (information types) we have identified are sufficient for modelling purposes. It is probably the case that they are correct enough for a beginning, and that no particularly disruptive perturbation of the model would be caused if another event type had to someday be accommodated or an existing event type had to be deleted. However, the omission of an XNET information type (not to be confused with the distinct "debugging" type) may have to be remedied before too long. - 28 -
5.5.2 What Information Should be Communicated to the GMCC Here there is a lot of room for varying opinion. The next cut at the model will try to identify as many potential events of interest as possible. Obviously, not all these events will be of interest to all implementers; that's why the Monitoring and Control mechanisms must be sure to allow for only partial participation on the part of any particular implementation. However, it may also be the case that we omit some event that is of particular interest to some gateway implementer, or the information which we choose to record about the event is not quite what is needed for some implementer's needs. Our collection mechanism must be flexible enough to accommodate extensions at any time. Here the real issue may be how to control, administratively, the selection of events of interest so that all parties are satisfied with the set selected. 5.5.3 How Should Information be Communicated to the GMCC We are of the opinion that in most cases, the basic gateway-to-GMCC communication facility should be datagram oriented on the basis that (1) connection overhead may be too expensive for certain gateway implementations, that (2) no flow control is probably needed since the gateways will not be generating data too frequently and since GMCCs will generally have substantially greater storage and processing capabilities than will the gateways, and that (3) a practical reporting scheme - 29 -
can probably be developed in which lost messages will not
necessarily represent lost information, merely delayed delivery
of information, since the contents of lost messages can be
inferred from later messages, (this is the case for cumulative
statistics for example); on the other hand, the datagrams should
carry sequencing information, and will of course employ standard
Internet Headers.
Datagram service will be satisfactory in most cases, we
hope. In certain instances, however, reliable transmissions may
be extremely important; for these instances, some additional
capability may have to be added. As yet, we have no real feel
for the capabilities required; thus this is still an open issue.
Also at issue is the decision as to whether internet messages
directed at the various gateway processes should all carry a
single protocol designator, or whether each different message
type should command a distinct designator. It is not yet clear
whether minimal gateway implementations would find it easier to
process messages formatted in one way vs. the other, or whether
it is too wasteful of the Internet Header's protocol field, or
whether it is easier one way or the other to subsequently add or
delete new message formats.
Beyond these basic issues, there is also the issue of
message formats and message content. Two alternatives present
themselves as regards event reporting. We assume that event
counters can be maintained in 16-bit words, say. We can insist
that messages contain a fixed number of counters in a fixed
order, and thus eliminate the need to transmit descriptive
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information with each reporting message. Or, we can allow for
every counter to be accompanied by another word which names the
counter. Tradeoffs between the two strategies are not yet
properly understood.
5.5.4 Addressing Processes from Outside the Gateway
Each of the gateway processes responsible for some activity
of Monitoring and Control has a unique identity, or name, within
the Catenet. But because the gateway is attached to multiple
nets, it is possible for each process to have multiple distinct
addresses. We can assume that one reasonable modelling for the
net-dependent input handler requires the input handler to
recognize at the net interface all the messages addressed to
processes which share its own net (and host) address. This is
the case for example in a general purpose implementation of the
gateway, since the general purpose input handler doesn't normally
receive messages for processes that don't share its own net
address. It probably should not be the responsibility of a given
net-dependent input handler to be aware that it is playing a role
in a gateway implementation, and thus to be cognizant of the
alternative internet addresses of the gateway processes it thinks
of as its own; i.e. the net-dependent code should not have to
know what other nets the gateway is connected to. Therefore, if
a message arrives at one net interface that specifies a resource
(process) whose net address is different from that of the input
handler, then the message should simply be handed off to a
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special process which can effect the proper disposition for the
message without further involvement of the input handler.
Figure 3 depicts this arrangement.
Here, each network has its own interface to a common copy of the
gateway process, so that it can communicate with it directly
whenever a message arrives which addresses the process via the
appropriate net. However, when a message is received for a
destination not known to the input handler, the message is simply
handed to the special process, which in this figure is referred
to as the "Postman". Note that the Postman can effect delivery
to the processes via its own interface, so that successful
delivery does not depend on the route taken by the message.
(Note that the model might want to specify that the Postman be
able to add messages to the input queues of the net-dependent
input handlers as a means for effecting delivery in a uniform
way.) The Postman here also has the responsibility for
performing the tasks associated with the routing of messages to
distant locations. That is, messages input at the gateway which
are only passing through should be routed by the general gateway
routing algorithms; these can be implemented by the Postman, or
by some other process to which the Postman interfaces.
There is, of course, another way to model the
net-dependent/net-independent boundary. Figure 4 shows this
other way.
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Basically the difference here is that the net-dependent input
handlers no longer have their own interfaces to the gateway
processes. Instead, they simply pass all received messages to
the internal Postman and allow it to effect delivery. This is an
acceptable approach even if in the general purpose host
implementation the net-dependent input handlers still have to
worry about interfacing processes which aren't using Internet
Headers. However, in this model, the Postman and the affected
processes must be sure to not lose the destination address by
which they were reached, lest they not be able to use the same
address for the source in the header of their response messages.
(We are somehow assuming that the recipient of a message whose
source address does not match the destination address which was
used for transmission, will not be anxious to perform the
required reverse lookup to map the source address into a resource
name. If we were to model this capability, it is not clear where
the processing for this lookup would be performed.)
At issue here then is just exactly which of these two models
should be assumed for "the" model implementation.
5.5.5 Addressing Processes from Inside the Gateway
Here is an issue which has certainly been touched on in
other internet meetings; it is basically a discussion of the need
for high level protocols to carry their own addressing
information.
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Gateway processes will have occassion to communicate with
other processes in support of gateway routing or gateway
Monitoring and Control. Traffic between two gateway processes
may be intrahost, intranet, or internet, depending on the
relative locations of the source and destination processes. At
issue is whether in all cases a single data transport protocol
should be used to effect message delivery. We have already
"concluded" in the discussion of event reporting that gateway
Monitoring and Control messages should employ Internet Headers in
all cases. And it would certainly seem on the surface that this
scheme is ideal. However, in certain cases this may not be true.
We are struck by an inconsistency which arises when we try
to attain symmetry in modelling the gateway's internal
organization. At one point in the model, we have a process whose
job it is to route messages through a given local net. Whenever _________
it is handed an internet message, it analyzes the header of the
message in order to determine the desired destination, and hence
what local address to specify in the net-dependent data transport
protocol.
The inconsistency is found because we don't have a
corresponding process whose job it is to analyze higher level
protocol headers in order to route messages through the internet ________
(using the internet data transport protocol). This means either
that each of our Monitoring and Control processes must make up an
Internet Header itself, or that, if some common process is to do
it, the common process must be handed the addressing information
by some "out-of-band" path (such as a shared memory control
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block). This may not be easy to provide for a distributed
gateway implementation, say.
The real issue here, of course, is inspired by the problems
we see for, say, TCP users, if the Internet and TCP Headers
recently proposed are adopted for use in the Catenet. The fact
that higher level protocols are being designed which don't carry
their own addressing information means that these protocols will
be practically unusable in any instance where the data transport
protocol used to carry the messages is different from the data
transport protocol embodied in the Internet Header. TCP, for
example, would probably not be usable without Internet Headers in
the ARPANET, since port addressing would be impossible.
Although it is probably the case that we will not opt to
include addressing information in the messages which adhere to
our higher level Monitoring and Control protocols, and will thus
in fact choose to use the Internet Header to provide addressing,
we nevertheless wonder if it is wise to arbitrarily restrict
these protocols to use with only a single data transport
protocol.
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