4.2. BIOS and Boot Loader Security
Password protection for the BIOS (or BIOS equivalent) and the boot loader can prevent unauthorized users who have physical access to systems from booting using removable media or attaining root through single user mode. But the security measures one should take to protect against such attacks depends both on the sensitivity of the information the workstation holds and the location of the machine.
For instance, if a machine is used in a trade show and contains no sensitive information, than it may not be critical to prevent such attacks. However, if an employee's laptop with private, unencrypted SSH keys for the corporate network is left unattended at that same trade show, it could lead to a major security breech with ramifications for the entire company.
On the other hand, if the workstation is located in a place where only authorized or trusted people have access, then securing the BIOS or the boot loader may not be necessary at all.
4.2.1. BIOS Passwords
The following are the two primary reasons for password protecting the BIOS of a computer[1]:
Preventing Changes to BIOS Settings — If an intruder has access to the BIOS, they can set it to boot off of a diskette or CD-ROM. This makes it possible for them to enter rescue mode or single user mode, which in turn allows them to seed nefarious programs on the system or copy sensitive data.
Preventing System Booting — Some BIOSes allow password protection of the boot process. When activated, an attacker is forced to enter a password before the BIOS launches the boot loader.
Because the methods for setting a BIOS password vary between computer manufacturers, consult the computer's manual for specific instructions.
If you forget the BIOS password, it can either be reset with jumpers on the motherboard or by disconnecting the CMOS battery. For this reason, it is good practice to lock the computer case if possible. However, consult the manual for the computer or motherboard before attempting this procedure.
4.2.1.1. Securing Non-x86 Platforms
Other architectures use different programs to perform low-level tasks roughly equivalent to those of the BIOS on x86 systems. For instance, Intel® Itanium™ computers use the Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) shell.
For instructions on password protecting BIOS-like programs on other architectures, refer to the manufacturer's instructions.
4.2.2. Boot Loader Passwords
The following are the primary reasons for password protecting a Linux boot loader:
Preventing Access to Single User Mode — If an attacker can boot into single user mode, he becomes the root user.
Preventing Access to the GRUB Console — If the machine uses GRUB as its boot loader, an attacker can use the use the GRUB editor interface to change its configuration or to gather information using the cat command.
Preventing Access to Non-Secure Operating Systems — If it is a dual-boot system, an attacker can select at boot time an operating system, such as DOS, which ignores access controls and file permissions.
There are two boot loaders that ship with Red Hat Enterprise Linux for the x86 platform, GRUB and LILO. For a detailed look at each of these boot loaders, consult the chapter titled Boot Loaders in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Reference Guide.
4.2.2.1. Password Protecting GRUB
GRUB can be configured to address the first two issues listed in Section 4.2.2 Boot Loader Passwords by adding a password directive to its configuration file. To do this, first decide on a password, then open a shell prompt, log in as root, and type:
/sbin/grub-md5-crypt |
When prompted, type the GRUB password and press
Next, edit the GRUB configuration file /boot/grub/grub.conf. Open the file and below the timeout line in the main section of the document, add the following line:
password --md5 <password-hash> |
Replace <password-hash> with the value returned by /sbin/grub-md5-crypt[2].
The next time the system boots, the GRUB menu does not allow access
to the editor or command interface without first pressing
Unfortunately, this solution does not prevent an attacker from booting into a non-secure operating system in a dual-boot environment. For this, a different part of the /boot/grub/grub.conf file must be edited.
Look for the title line of the non-secure operating system and add a line that says lock directly beneath it.
For a DOS system, the stanza should begin similar to the following:
title DOS lock |
 | Warning |
|---|---|
A password line must be present in the main section of the /boot/grub/grub.conf file for this method to work properly. Otherwise, an attacker can access the GRUB editor interface and remove the lock line. |
To create a different password for a particular kernel or operating system, add a lock line to the stanza followed by a password line.
Each stanza protected with a unique password should begin with lines similar to the following example:
title DOS lock password --md5 <password-hash> |
4.2.2.2. Password Protecting LILO
LILO is a much simpler boot loader than GRUB and does not offer a command interface, so an attacker cannot gain interactive access to the system before the kernel is loaded. However, it is still possible for an attacker to boot into single-user mode or into an insecure operating system.
Password protecting LILO can be accomplished by adding a password directive in to the global section of its configuration file. To do this, open a shell prompt, log in as root, and edit /etc/lilo.conf. Before the first image stanza, add a password directive similar to the following example:
password=<password> |
In the above directive, replace <password> with the password for LILO.
 | Important |
|---|---|
When editing /etc/lilo.conf, the /sbin/lilo -v -v command must be run for the changes to take effect. If a password has been configured and anyone other than root can read the file, LILO installs properly, but notifies the user that the permissions on the configuration file are incorrect. |
If a global password is not desirable, the password directive can be added to any stanza corresponding to any kernel or operating system. To do this, add the password directive immediately below the image line. When finished, the beginning of the password-protected stanza resembles the following:
image=/boot/vmlinuz-<version>
password=<password> |
In the previous example, replace <version> with kernel version and <password> with the LILO password for that kernel.
It is also possible to allow the booting of a kernel or operating system without password verification, while preventing users from specifying arguments without a password. To do this, add the restricted directive on the line below the password line within the stanza. Such a stanza begins similar to the following example:
image=/boot/vmlinuz-<version>
password=<password>
restricted |
Replace <version> with kernel version and <password> with the LILO password for that kernel.
If using the restricted directive, there must also be a password line within the stanza.
| Warning | |
|---|---|---|
The /etc/lilo.conf file is world-readable. If you are password protecting LILO, it is essential to only allow the root user to read and edit the file since all passwords are in plain text. To do this, type the following command as root:
|